Polisis: Automated Analysis and Presentation of Privacy Policies Using
  Deep Learning by Harkous, Hamza et al.
Polisis: Automated Analysis and
Presentation of Privacy Policies Using Deep Learning
Hamza Harkous1, Kassem Fawaz2, Re´mi Lebret1, Florian Schaub3, Kang G. Shin3, and Karl Aberer1
1 E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL)
2 University of of Wisconsin-Madison
3 University of Michigan
Abstract
Privacy policies are the primary channel through which
companies inform users about their data collection and
sharing practices. These policies are often long and diffi-
cult to comprehend. Short notices based on information
extracted from privacy policies have been shown to be
useful but face a significant scalability hurdle, given the
number of policies and their evolution over time. Com-
panies, users, researchers, and regulators still lack usable
and scalable tools to cope with the breadth and depth of
privacy policies. To address these hurdles, we propose an
automated framework for privacy policy analysis (Poli-
sis). It enables scalable, dynamic, and multi-dimensional
queries on natural language privacy policies. At the core
of Polisis is a privacy-centric language model, built with
130K privacy policies, and a novel hierarchy of neural-
network classifiers that accounts for both high-level as-
pects and fine-grained details of privacy practices. We
demonstrate Polisis’ modularity and utility with two ap-
plications supporting structured and free-form querying.
The structured querying application is the automated as-
signment of privacy icons from privacy policies. With
Polisis, we can achieve an accuracy of 88.4% on this
task. The second application, PriBot, is the first free-
form question-answering system for privacy policies. We
show that PriBot can produce a correct answer among
its top-3 results for 82% of the test questions. Using an
MTurk user study with 700 participants, we show that at
least one of PriBot’s top-3 answers is relevant to users
for 89% of the test questions.
1 Introduction
Privacy policies are one of the most common ways of
providing notice and choice online. They aim to inform
users how companies collect, store and manage their
personal information. Although some service providers
have improved the comprehensibility and readability of
their privacy policies, these policies remain excessively
long and difficult to follow [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In 2008, Mc-
Donald and Cranor [4] estimated that it would take an
average user 201 hours to read all the privacy policies
encountered in a year. Since then, we have witnessed
a smartphone revolution and the rise of the Internet of
Things (IoTs), which lead to the proliferation of ser-
vices and associated policies [6]. In addition, emerging
technologies brought along new forms of user interfaces
(UIs), such as voice-controlled devices or wearables, for
which existing techniques for presenting privacy policies
are not suitable [3, 6, 7, 8].
Problem Description. Users, researchers, and regula-
tors are not well-equipped to process or understand the
content of privacy policies, especially at scale. Users are
surprised by data practices that do not meet their expec-
tations [9], hidden in long, vague, and ambiguous poli-
cies. Researchers employ expert annotators to analyze
and reason about a subset of the available privacy poli-
cies [10, 11]. Regulators, such as the U.S. Department of
Commerce, rely on companies to self-certify their com-
pliance with privacy practices (e.g., the Privacy Shield
Framework [12]). The problem lies in stakeholders lack-
ing the usable and scalable tools to deal with the breadth
and depth of privacy policies.
Several proposals have aimed at alternative methods
and UIs for presenting privacy notices [8], including
machine-readable formats [13], nutrition labels [14], pri-
vacy icons (recently recommended by the EU [15]), and
short notices [16]. Unfortunately, these approaches have
faced a significant scalability hurdle: the human effort
needed to retrofit the new notices to existing policies and
maintain them over time is tremendous. The existing re-
search towards automating this process has been limited
in scope to a handful of “queries,” e.g., whether the pol-
icy mentions data encryption or whether it provides an
opt-out choice from third-party tracking [16, 17].
Our Framework. We overcome this scalability hurdle
by proposing an automatic and comprehensive frame-
work for privacy policy analysis (Polisis). It divides a
privacy policy into smaller and self-contained fragments
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of text, referred to as segments. Polisis automatically an-
notates, with high accuracy, each segment with a set of
labels describing its data practices. Unlike prior research
in automatic labeling/analysis of privacy policies, Poli-
sis does not just predict a handful of classes given the
entire policy document. Instead, Polisis annotates the
privacy policy at a much finer-grained scale. It predicts
for each segment the set of classes that account for both
the high-level aspects and the fine-grained classes of em-
bedded privacy information. Polisis uses these classes to
enable scalable, dynamic, and multi-dimensional queries
on privacy policies, in a way not possible with prior ap-
proaches.
At the core of Polisis is a novel hierarchy of neural-
network classifiers that involve 10 high-level and 122
fine-grained privacy classes for privacy-policy segments.
To build these fine-grained classifiers, we leverage tech-
niques such as subword embeddings and multi-label
classification. We further seed these classifiers with a
custom, privacy-specific language model that we gener-
ated using our corpus of more than 130,000 privacy poli-
cies from websites and mobile apps.
Polisis provides the underlying intelligence for re-
searchers and regulators to focus their efforts on merely
designing a set of queries that power their applications.
We stress, however, that Polisis is not intended to replace
the privacy policy – as a legal document – with an auto-
mated interpretation. Similar to existing approaches on
privacy policies’ analysis and presentation, it decouples
the legally binding functionality of these policies from
their informational utility.
Applications. We demonstrate and evaluate the modu-
larity and utility of Polisis with two robust applications
that support structured and free-form querying of privacy
policies.
The structured querying application involves extract-
ing short notices in the form of privacy icons from pri-
vacy policies. As a case study, we investigate the Dis-
connect privacy icons [18]. By composing a set of sim-
ple rules on top of Polisis, we show a solution that can
automatically select appropriate privacy icons from a pri-
vacy policy. We further study the practice of companies
assigning icons to privacy policies at scale. We empiri-
cally demonstrate that existing privacy-compliance com-
panies, such as TRUSTe (now rebranded as TrustArc),
might be adopting permissive policies when assigning
such privacy icons. Our findings are consistent with
anecdotal controversies and manually investigated issues
in privacy certification and compliance processes [19, 20,
21].
The second application illustrates the power of free-
form querying in Polisis. We design, implement and
evaluate PriBot, the first automated Question-Answering
(QA) system for privacy policies. PriBot extracts the
relevant privacy policy segments to answer the user’s
free-form questions. To build PriBot, we overcame the
non-existence of a public, privacy-specific QA dataset by
casting the problem as a ranking problem that could be
solved using the classification results of Polisis. PriBot
matches user questions with answers from a previously
unseen privacy policy, in real time and with high accu-
racy – demonstrating a more intuitive and user-friendly
way to present privacy notices and controls. We evalu-
ate PriBot using a new test dataset, based on real-world
questions that have been asked by consumers on Twitter.
Contributions. With this paper we make the following
contributions:
• We design and implement Polisis, an approach for au-
tomatically annotating previously unseen privacy poli-
cies with high-level and fine-grained labels from a pre-
specified taxonomy (Sec. 2, 3, 4, and 5).
• We demonstrate how Polisis can be used to assign pri-
vacy icons to a privacy policy with an average accu-
racy of 88.4%. This accuracy is computed by com-
paring icons assigned with Polisis’ automatic labels to
icons assigned based on manual annotations by three
legal experts from the OPP-115 dataset [11] (Sec. 6).
• We design, implement and evaluate PriBot, a QA sys-
tem that answers free-form user questions from pri-
vacy policies (Sec. 7). Our accuracy evaluation shows
that PriBot produces at least one correct answer (as in-
dicated by privacy experts) in its top three for 82% of
the test questions and as the top one for 68% of the test
questions. Our evaluation of the perceived utility with
700 MTurk crowdworkers shows that users find a rele-
vant answer in PriBot’s top-3 for 89% of the questions
(Sec. 8).
• We make Polisis publicly available by providing three
web services demonstrating our applications: a ser-
vice giving a visual overview of the different aspects
of each privacy policy, a chatbot for answering user
questions in real time, and a privacy-labels interface
for privacy policies. These services are available at
https://pribot.org. We provide screenshots of
these applications in Appendix B.
2 Framework Overview
Fig. 1 shows a high-level overview of Polisis. It com-
prises three layers: Application Layer, Data Layer, and
Machine Learning (ML) Layer. Polisis treats a privacy
policy as a list of semantically coherent segments (i.e.,
groups of consecutive sentences). It also utilizes a tax-
onomy of privacy data practices. One example of such a
taxonomy was introduced by Wilson et al. [11] (see also
Fig. 3 in Sec. 4).
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Fig. 1: A high-level overview of Polisis.
Application Layer (Sec. 5, 6 & 7): The Applica-
tion Layer provides fine-grained information about the
privacy policy, thus providing the users with high mod-
ularity in posing their queries. In this layer, a Query
Module receives the User Query about a privacy policy
(Step 1 in Fig. 1). These inputs are forwarded to lower
layers, which then extract the privacy classes embedded
within the query and the policy’s segments. To resolve
the user query, the Class-Comparison module identifies
the segments with privacy classes matching those of the
query. Then, it passes the matched segments (with their
predicted classes) back to the application.
Data Layer (Sec. 3): The Data Layer first scrapes the
policy’s webpage. Then, it partitions the policy into se-
mantically coherent and adequately sized segments (us-
ing the Segmenter component in Step 2 of Fig. 1). Each
of the resulting segments can be independently con-
sumed by both the humans and programming interfaces.
Machine Learning Layer (Sec. 4): In order to en-
able a multitude of applications to be built around Poli-
sis, the ML layer is responsible for producing rich and
fine-grained annotations of the data segments. This layer
takes as an input the privacy-policy segments from the
Data Layer (Step 2) and the user query (Step 1) from the
Application Layer. The Segment Classifier probabilisti-
cally assigns each segment a set of class–value pairs de-
scribing its data practices. For example, an element in
this set can be information-type=location with probabil-
ity p = 0.65. Similarly, the Query Analyzer extracts the
privacy classes from the user’s query. Finally, the class–
value pairs of both the segments and the query are passed
back to the Class Comparison module of the Application
Layer (Steps 3 and 4).
3 Data Layer
To pre-process the privacy policy, the Data Layer em-
ploys a Segmenter module in three stages: extraction, list
handling, and segmentation. The Data Layer requires no
information other than the link to the privacy policy.
Further useful privacy and security related materials can be found through Google’s policies 
and principles pages, including:
o Information about our technologies and principles, which includes, among other things, 
more information on
• how Google uses cookies.
• technologies we use for advertising.
• how we recognize patterns like faces.
o A page that explains what data is shared with Google when you visit websites that use our 
advertising, analytics and social products.
o The Privacy Checkup tool, which makes it easy to review your key privacy settings.
o Google’s safety center, which provides information on how to stay safe and secure online.
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Fig. 2: List merging during the policy segmentation.
Policy Extraction: Given the URL of a privacy pol-
icy, the segmenter employs Google Chrome in head-
less mode (without UI) to scrape the policy’s web-
page. It waits for the page to fully load which hap-
pens after all the JavaScript has been downloaded and
executed. Then, the segmenter removes all irrelevant
HTML elements including the scripts, header, footer,
side/navigation menus, comments, and CSS.
Although several online privacy policies contain dy-
namically viewable content (e.g., accordion toggles and
collapsible/expandable paragraphs), the “dynamic” con-
tent is already part of the loaded webpage in almost all
cases. For example, when the user expands a collapsible
paragraph, a local JavaScript exposes an offline HTML
snippet; no further downloading takes place.
We confirmed this with the privacy policies of the top
200 global websites from Alexa.com. For each privacy-
policy link, we compared the segmenter’s scraped con-
tent to that extracted from our manual navigation of the
same policy (while accounting for all the dynamically
viewable elements of the webpage). Using a fuzzy string
matching library,1 we found that the segmenter’s scraped
policy covers, on average, 99.08% of the content of the
manually fetched policy.
List Aggregation: Second, the segmenter handles any
ordered/unordered lists inside the policy. Lists require
a special treatment since counting an entire lengthy list,
possibly covering diverse data practices, as a single seg-
ment could result in noisy annotations. On the other
hand, treating each list item as an independent segment
is problematic as list elements are typically not self-
contained, resulting in missed annotations. See Fig. 2
from Google’s privacy policy as an example2.
Our handling of the lists involves two techniques: one
for short list items (e.g., the inner list of Fig. 2) and an-
other for longer list items (e.g., the outer list of Fig. 2).
For short list items (maximum of 20 words per element),
the segmenter combines the elements with the introduc-
tory statement of the list into a single paragraph element
(with <p> tag). The rest of the lists with long items are
transformed into a set of paragraphs. Each paragraph is a
1https://pypi.python.org/pypi/fuzzywuzzy
2https://www.google.com/intl/en US/policies/
privacy/archive/20160829/, last modified on Aug. 29, 2016,
retrieved on Jun. 27, 2018
3
distinct list element prepended by the list’s introductory
statement (Step 3 in Fig. 2).
Policy Segmentation: The segmenter performs an ini-
tial coarse segmentation by breaking down the policy
according to the HTML <div> and <p> tags. The out-
put of this step is an initial set of policy segments. As
some of the resulting segments might still be long, we
subdivide them further with another technique. We use
GraphSeg [22], an unsupervised algorithm that gener-
ates semantically coherent segments. It relies on word
embeddings to generate segments as cliques of related
(semantically similar) sentences. For that purpose, we
use custom, domain-specific word embeddings that we
generated using our corpus of 130K privacy policies (cf.
Sec. 4). Finally, the segmenter outputs a series of fine-
grained segments to the Machine Learning Layer, where
they are automatically analyzed.
4 Machine Learning Layer
This section describes the components of Polisis’ Ma-
chine Learning Layer in two stages: (1) an unsupervised
stage, in which we build domain-specific word vectors
(i.e., word embeddings) for privacy policies from unla-
beled data, and (2) a supervised stage, in which we train a
novel hierarchy of privacy-text classifiers, based on neu-
ral networks, that leverages the word vectors. These clas-
sifiers power the Segment Classifier and Query Analyzer
modules of Fig. 1. We use word embeddings and neural
networks thanks to their proven advantages in text clas-
sification [23] over traditional techniques.
4.1 Privacy-Specific Word Embeddings
Traditional text classifiers use the words and their fre-
quencies as the building block for their features. They,
however, have limited generalization power, especially
when the training datasets are limited in size and scope.
For example, replacing the word “erase” by the word
“delete” can significantly change the classification result
if “delete” was not in the classifier’s training set.
Word embeddings solve this issue by extracting
generic word vectors from a large corpus, in an unsu-
pervised manner, and enabling their use in new classifi-
cation problems (a technique termed Transfer Learning).
The features in the classifiers become the word vectors
instead of the words themselves. Hence, two text seg-
ments composed of semantically similar words would be
represented by two groups of word vectors (i.e., features)
that are close in the vector space. This allows the text
classifier to account for words outside the training set, as
long as they are part of the large corpus used to train the
word vectors.
While general-purpose pre-trained embeddings, such
as Word2vec [24] and GloVe [25] do exist, domain-
specific embeddings result in better classification accu-
racy [26]. Thus, we trained custom word embeddings
for the privacy-policy domain. To that end, we created a
corpus of 130K privacy policies collected from apps on
the Google Play Store. These policies typically describe
the overall data practices of the apps’ companies.
We crawled the metadata of more than 1.4 million An-
droid apps available via the PlayDrone project [27] to
find the links to 199,186 privacy policies. We crawled
the web pages for these policies, retrieving 130,326 poli-
cies which returned an HTTP status code of 200. Then,
we extracted the textual content from their HTML us-
ing the policy crawler described in Sec. 3. We will refer
to this corpus as the Policies Corpus. Using this corpus,
we trained a word-embeddings model using fastText [28].
We henceforth call this model the Policies Embeddings.
A major advantage of using fastText is that it allows train-
ing vectors for subwords (or character n-grams of sizes 3
to 6) in addition to words. Hence, even if we have words
outside our corpus, we can assign them vectors by com-
bining the vectors of their constituent subwords. This is
very useful in accounting for spelling mistakes that occur
in applications that involve free-form user queries.
4.2 Classification Dataset
Our Policies Embeddings provides a solid starting
point to build robust classifiers. However, training the
classifiers to detect fine-grained labels of privacy poli-
cies’ segments requires a labeled dataset. For that pur-
pose, we leverage the Online Privacy Policies (OPP-
115) dataset, introduced by Wilson et al. [11]. This
dataset contains 115 privacy policies manually annotated
by skilled annotators (law school students). In total, the
dataset has 23K annotated data practices. The anno-
tations were at two levels. First, paragraph-sized seg-
ments were annotated according to one or more of the
10 high-level categories in Fig. 3 (e.g., First Party Col-
lection, Data Retention). Then, annotators selected parts
of the segment and annotated them using attribute–value
pairs, e.g., information type: location, purpose: adver-
tising, etc. In total, there were 20 distinct attributes and
138 distinct values across all attributes. Of these, 122
values had more than 20 labels. In Fig. 3, we only show
the mandatory attributes that should be present in all seg-
ments. Due to space limitation, we only show samples of
the values for selected attributes in Fig. 3.
4.3 Hierarchical Multi-label Classification
To account for the multiple granularity levels in the
policies’ text, we build a hierarchy of classifiers that
are individually trained on handling specific parts of the
problem.
At the top level, a classifier predicts one or more high-
level categories of the input segment x (categories are the
top-level, shaded boxes of Fig. 3). We train a multi-label
classifier that provides us with the probability p(ci|x) of
the occurrence of each high-level category ci, taken from
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Fig. 3: The privacy taxonomy of Wilson et al. [11]. The top level of the hierarchy (shaded blocks) defines high-level privacy
categories. The lower level defines a set of privacy attributes, each assuming a set of values. We show examples of values for
some of the attributes.
the set of all categories C . In addition to allowing mul-
tiple categories per segment, using a multi-label classi-
fier makes it possible to determine whether a category is
present in a segment by simply comparing its classifica-
tion probability to a threshold of 0.5.
At the lower level, a set of classifiers predicts one
or more values for each privacy attribute (the leaves
in the taxonomy of Fig. 3). We train a set of multi-
label classifiers on the attribute-level. Each classifier
produces the probabilities p(v j|x) for the values v j ∈
V (b) of a single attribute b. For example, given the
attribute b=information type , the corresponding clas-
sifier outputs the probabilities for elements in V (b):
{financial, location, user profile, health, demographics,
cookies, contact information, generic personal informa-
tion, unspecified, . . .}.
An important consequence of this hierarchy is that in-
terpreting the output of the attribute-level classifier de-
pends on the categories’ probabilities. For example, the
values’ probabilities of the attribute “retention period”
are irrelevant when the dominant high-level category is
“policy change.” Hence, for a category ci, one would
only consider the attributes descending from it in the hi-
erarchy. We denote these attributes as A (ci) and the set
of all values across these attributes as V (ci).
We use Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) in-
ternally within all the classifiers for two main reasons,
which are also common in similar classification tasks.
First, CNNs enable us to integrate pre-trained word em-
beddings that provide the classifiers with better gener-
alization capabilities. Second, CNNs recognize when a
certain set of tokens are a good indicator of the class, in
a way that is invariant to their position within the input
segment.
We use a similar CNN architecture for classifiers on
both levels as shown in Fig. 4. Segments are split into to-
kens, using PENN Treebank tokenization in NLTK [29].
The embeddings layer outputs the word vectors of these
tokens. We froze that layer, preventing its weights from
being updated, in order to preserve the learnt seman-
tic similarity between all the words present in our Poli-
cies Embeddings. Next, the word vectors pass through a
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Fig. 4: Components of the CNN-based classifier used.
Convolutional layer, whose main role is applying a non-
linear function (a Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU)) over
windows of k words. Then, a max-pooling layer com-
bines the vectors resulting from the different windows
into a single vector. This vector then passes through the
first dense (i.e., fully-connected) layer with a ReLU ac-
tivation function, and finally through the second dense
layer. A sigmoid operation is applied to the output of
the last layer to obtain the probabilities for the possible
output classes. We used multi-label cross-entropy loss
as the classifier’s objective function. We refer interested
readers to [30] for further elaborations on how CNNs are
used in such contexts.
Models’ Training. In total, we trained 20 classifiers at
the attribute level (including the optional attributes). We
also trained two classifiers at the category level: one for
classifying segments and the other for classifying free-
form queries. For the former, we include all the classes
in Fig. 3. For the latter, we ignore the “Other” cate-
gory as it is mainly for introductory sentences or uncov-
ered practices [11], which are not applicable to users’
queries. For training the classifiers, we used the data
from 65 policies in the OPP-115 dataset, and we kept
50 policies as a testing set. The hyper-parameters for
each classifier were obtained by running a randomized
grid-search. In Table 1, we present the evaluation met-
rics on the testing set for the category classifier intended
for free-form queries. In addition to the precision, re-
call and F1 scores (macro-averaged per label3), we also
3A successful multilabel classifier should not only predict the pres-
ence of a label, but also its absence. Otherwise, a model that predicts
that all labels are present would have 100% precision and recall. For
that, the precision in the table represents the macro-average of the pre-
cision in predicting the presence of each label and predicting its ab-
sence (similarly for recall and F1 metrics).
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Table 1: Classification results for user queries at the category
level. Hyperparameters: Embeddings size: 300, Number of
filters: 200, Filter Size: 3, Dense Layer Size: 100, Batch Size:
40
Category Prec. Recall F1 Top-1Prec. Support
1st Party Collection 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 1267
3rd Party Sharing 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.86 963
User Choice/Control 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.81 455
Data Security 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.77 202
Specific Audiences 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.91 156
Access, Edit, Delete 0.94 0.75 0.82 0.97 134
Policy Change 0.96 0.89 0.92 0.93 120
Data Retention 0.79 0.67 0.71 0.60 93
Do Not Track 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 16
Average 0.87 0.83 0.84 0.84
show the top-1 precision metric, representing the fraction
of segments where the top predicted category label oc-
curs in the annotators’ ground-truth labels. As evident in
the table, our classifiers can predict the top-level privacy
category with high accuracy. Although we consider the
problem in the multi-label setting, these metrics are sig-
nificantly higher than the models presented in the orig-
inal OPP-115 paper [11]. The full results for the rest
of classifiers are presented in Appendix A. The efficacy
of these classifiers is further highlighted through queries
that directly leverage their output in the applications de-
scribed next.
5 Application Layer
Leveraging the power of the ML Layer’s classifiers,
Polisis supports both structured and free-from queries
about a privacy policy’s content. A structured query
is a combination of first-order logic predicates over
the predicted privacy classes and the policy segments,
such as: ∃s (s ∈ policy ∧ information type(s)=location ∧
purpose(s) = marketing ∧ user choice(s)=opt-out). On
the other hand, a free-form query is simply a natural lan-
guage question posed directly by the users, such as “do
you share my location with third parties?”. The response
to a query is the set of segments satisfying the predicates
in the case of a structured query or matching the user’s
question in the case of a free-form query. The Appli-
cation Layer builds on these query types to enable an ar-
ray of applications for different privacy stakeholders. We
take an exemplification approach to give the reader a bet-
ter intuition on these applications, before delving deeper
into two of them in the next sections.
Users: Polisis can automatically populate several of the
previously-proposed short notices for privacy policies,
such as nutrition tables and privacy icons [3, 18, 31, 32].
This task can be achieved by mapping the notices to
a set of structured queries (cf. Sec. 6). Another pos-
sible application is privacy-centered comparative shop-
ping [33]. A user can build on Polisis’ output to auto-
matically quantify the privacy utility of a certain policy.
For example, such a privacy metric could be a combi-
nation of positive scores describing privacy-protecting
features (e.g., policy containing a segment with the la-
bel: retention period: stated period ) and negative scores
describing privacy-infringing features (e.g., policy con-
taining a segment with the label: retention period: un-
limited ). A major advantage of automatically generat-
ing short notices is that they can be seamlessly refreshed
when policies are updated or when the rules to generate
these notices are modified. Otherwise, discrepancies be-
tween policies and notices might arise over time, which
deters companies from adopting the short notices in the
first place.
By answering free-form queries with relevant policy
segments, Polisis can remove the interface barrier be-
tween the policy and the users, especially in conver-
sational interfaces (e.g., voice assistants and chatbots).
Taking a step further, Polisis’ output can be potentially
used to automatically rephrase the answer segments to a
simpler language. A rule engine can generate text based
on the combination of predicted classes of an answer seg-
ment (e.g., “We share data with third parties. This con-
cerns our users’ information, like your online activities. We
need this to respond to requests from legal authorities”).
Researchers: The difficultly of analyzing the data-
collection claims by companies at scale has often been
cited as a limitation in ecosystem studies (e.g., [34]).
Polisis can provide the means to overcome that. For in-
stance, researchers interested in analyzing apps that ad-
mit collecting health data [35, 36] could utilize Polisis to
query a dataset of app policies. One example query can
be formed by joining the label information type: health
with the category of First Party Collection or Third Party
Sharing.
Regulators: Numerous studies from regulators and
law and public policy researchers have manually ana-
lyzed the permissiveness of compliance checks [21, 37].
The number of assessed privacy policies in these stud-
ies is typically in the range of tens of policies. For in-
stance, the Norwegian Consumer Council has investi-
gated the level of ambiguity in defining personal infor-
mation within only 20 privacy policies [37]. Polisis can
scale such studies by processing a regulator’s queries on
large datasets. For example, with Polisis, policies can
be ranked according to an automated ambiguity met-
ric by using the information type attribute and differ-
entiating between the label generic personal information
and other labels specifying the type of data collected.
Similarly, this applies to frameworks such as Privacy
Shield [12] and the GDPR [15], where issues such as
limiting the data usage purposes should be investigated.
6
6 Privacy Icons
Our first application shows the efficacy of Polisis in
resolving structured queries to privacy policies. As
a case study, we investigate the Disconnect privacy
icons [18], described in the first three columns of Table 2.
These icons evolved from a Mozilla-led working group
that included the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Cen-
ter for Democracy and Technology, and the W3C. The
database powering these icons originated from TRUSTe
(re-branded later as TrustArc), a privacy compliance
company, which carried out the task of manually ana-
lyzing and labeling privacy policies.
In what follows, we first establish the accuracy of Poli-
sis’ automatic assignment of privacy icons, using the
Disconnect icons as a proof-of-concept. We perform
a direct comparison between assigning these icons via
Polisis and assigning them based on annotations by law
students [11]. Second, we leverage Polisis to investi-
gate the level of permissiveness of the icons that Discon-
nect assigns based on the TRUSTe dataset. Our findings
are consistent with the series of concerns raised around
compliance-checking companies over the years [21, 38,
39]. This demonstrates the power of Polisis in scalable,
automated auditing of privacy compliance checks.
6.1 Predicting Privacy Icons
Given that the rules behind the Disconnect icons are
not precisely defined, we translated their description into
explicit first-order logic queries to enable automatic pro-
cessing. Table 2 shows the original description and color
assignment provided by Disconnect. We also show our
interpretation of each icon in terms of labels present in
the OPP-115 dataset and the automated assignment of
colors based on these labels. Our goal is not to reverse-
engineer the logic behind the creation of these icons but
to show that we can automatically assign such icons with
high accuracy, given a plausible interpretation. Hence,
this represents our best effort to reproduce the icons, but
these rules could easily be adapted as needed.
To evaluate the efficacy of automatically selecting
appropriate privacy icons, we compare the icons pro-
duced with Polisis’ automatic labels to the icons pro-
duced based on the law students’ annotations from the
OPP-115 dataset [11]. We perform the evaluation over
the same set of 50 privacy policies which we did not use
to train Polisis (i.e., kept aside as a testing set). Each seg-
ment in the OPP-115 dataset has been labeled by three
experts. Hence, we take the union of the experts’ labels
on one hand and the predicted labels from Polisis on the
other hand. Then, we run the logic presented in Table 2
(Columns 4 and 5) to assign icons to each policy based
on each set of labels.
Table 3 shows the accuracy obtained per icon, mea-
sured as the fraction of policies where the icon based on
automatic labels matched the icon based on the experts’
labels. The average accuracy across icons is 88.4%,
showing the efficacy of our approach in matching the
experts’ aggregated annotations. This result is signif-
icant in view of Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy’s find-
ing [21]: the level of agreement among 3 trained human
judges assessing privacy policies ranged from 88.3% to
98.3%, with an average of 92.7% agreement overall. We
also show Cohen’s κ , an agreement measure that ac-
counts for agreement due to random chance4. In our
case, the values indicate substantial to almost perfect
agreement [40]. Finally, we show the distribution of
icons based on the experts’ labels alongside Hellinger
distance5, which measures the difference between that
distribution and the one produced using the automatic
labels. This distance assumes small values, illustrating
that the distributions are very close. Overall, these results
support the potential of automatically assigning privacy
icons with Polisis.
6.2 Auditing Compliance Metrics
Given that we achieve a high accuracy in assigning
privacy icons, it is intuitive to investigate how they com-
pare to the icons assigned by Disconnect and TRUSTe.
An important consideration in this regard is that sev-
eral concerns have been raised earlier around the level
of leniency of TRUSTe and other compliance compa-
nies [19, 20, 38, 39]. In 2000, the FTC conducted a study
on privacy seals, including those of TRUSTe, and found
that, of the 27 sites with a privacy seal, approximately
only half implemented, at least in part, all four of the fair
information practice principles and that only 63% imple-
mented Notice and Choice. Hence, we pose the follow-
ing question: Can we automatically provide evidence of
the level of leniency of the Disconnect icons using Poli-
sis? To answer this question, we designed an experiment
to compare the icons extracted by Polisis’ automatic la-
bels to the icons assigned by Disconnect on real policies.
One obstacle we faced is that the Disconnect icons
have been announced in June 2014 [41]; many privacy
policies have likely been updated since then. To ensure
that the privacy policies we consider are within a close
time frame to those used by Disconnect, we make use of
Ramanath et al.’s ACL/COLING 2014 dataset [42]. This
dataset contains the body of 1,010 privacy policies ex-
tracted between December 2013 and January 2014. We
obtained the icons for the same set of sites using the Dis-
connect privacy icons extension [18]. Of these, 354 poli-
cies had been (at least partially) annotated in the Discon-
nect dataset. We automatically assign the icons for these
sites by passing their policy contents into Polisis and ap-
plying the rules in Table 2 on the generated automatic la-
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cohen%27s kappa
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellinger distance
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Table 2: The list of Disconnect icons with their description, our interpretation, and Polisis’ queries.
Icon Disconnect Description Disconnect Color Assignment Interpretation as Labels Automated Color Assignment
Expected
Use
Discloses whether data it
collects about you is
used in ways other than
you would reasonably
expect given the site’s
service?
Red: Yes, w/o choice to
opt-out. Or, undisclosed.
Yellow: Yes, with choice to
opt-out.
Green: No.
Let S be the segments with category:
first-party-collection-use and purpose:
advertising. 
Yellow: All segments in S have
category: user-choice-control and
choice-type ∈
[opt-in, opt-out-link,
opt-out-via-contacting-company]
Green: S = φ
Red: Otherwise
Expected
Collec-
tion
Discloses whether it
allows other companies
like ad providers and
analytics firms to track
users on the site?
Red: Yes, w/o choice to
opt-out. Or, undisclosed.
Yellow: Yes, with choice to
opt-out.
Green: No.
Let S be the segments with category:
third-party-sharing-collection, purpose:
∈ [advertising,analytics-research ], and
action-third-party
∈ [track-on-first-party-website-app,collect-
on-first-party-website-app].
Precise
Location
Discloses whether the
site or service tracks a
user’s actual
geolocation?
Red: Yes, possibly w/o choice.
Yellow: Yes, with choice.
Green: No.
Let S be the segments with
personal-information-type: location.
Data
Retention Discloses how long they
retain your personal
data?
Red: No data retention policy.
Yellow: 12+ months.
Green: 0-12 months.
Let S be the segments with category:
data-retention.
Green: All segments in S have
retention-period: ∈
[stated-period, limited ].
Red: S = φ
Yellow: Otherwise
Children
Privacy Has this website received
TrustArc’s Children’s
Privacy Certification?
Green: Yes. Gray: No.
Let S be the segments with category:
international-and-specific-audiences and
audience-type: children
Green: length(S)> 0
Red: Otherwise
Table 3: Prediction accuracy and κ for icon prediction, with
the distribution of icons per color based on OPP-115 labels.
Icon Accuracy Cohen κ Hellingerdistance N(R) N(G) N(Y)
Exp. Use 92% 0.76 0.12 41 8 1
Exp. Collection 88% 0.69 0.19 35 12 3
Precise Location 84% 0.68 0.21 32 14 4
Data Retention 80% 0.63 0.13 29 16 5
Children Privacy 98% 0.95 0.02 12 38 NA
bels. We report the results for the Expected Use and Ex-
pected Collection icons as they are directly interpretable
by Polisis. We do not report the rest of the icons because
the location information label in the OPP-115 taxonomy
included non-precise location (e.g., zip codes), and there
was no label that distinguishes the exact retention period.
Moreover, the Children privacy icon is assigned through
a certification process that does not solely rely on the pri-
vacy policy.
Fig. 5 shows the distribution of automatically ex-
tracted icons vs. the distribution of icons from Discon-
nect, when they were available. The discrepancy be-
tween the two distributions is obvious: the vast majority
of the Disconnect icons have a yellow label, indicating
that the policies offer the user an opt-out choice (from
unexpected use or collection). The Hellinger distances
between those distributions are 0.71 and 0.61 for Ex-
pected Use and Expected Collection, respectively (i.e.,
3–5x the distance in the Table 3).
This discrepancy might stem from our icon-
assignment strategy in Table 2, where we assign a
yellow label only when “All segments in S (the con-
cerned subset)” include the opt-in/opt-out choice, which
could be considered as conservative. In Fig. 6, we show
the icon distributions when relaxing the yellow-icon
condition to become: “At least one segment in S” in-
cludes the opt-in/opt-out choice. Intuitively, this means
that the choice segment, when present, should explicitly
mention advertising/analytics (depending on the icon
type). Although the number of yellow icons increases
slightly, the icons with the new permissive strategy are
significantly red-dominated. The Hellinger distances
between those distributions drop to 0.47 and 0.50 for
Expected Use and Expected Collection, respectively.
This result indicates that the majority of policies do
not provide users a choice within the same segments
describing data usage for advertising or data collection
by third parties.
We go one step further to follow an even more permis-
sive strategy where we assign the yellow label to any pol-
icy with S!= φ , given that there is at least one segment in
the whole policy (i.e., even outside S) with opt-in/opt-out
choice. For example, a policy where third-party adver-
tising is mentioned in the middle of the policy while the
opt-out choice about another action is mentioned at the
end of the policy would still receive a yellow label. The
icon distributions, in this case, are illustrated in Fig. 7,
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Fig. 7: Very permissive icons’ interpretation
with Hellinger distance of 0.22 for Expected Use and
0.19 for Expected Collection. Only in this interpreta-
tion of the icons would the distributions of Disconnect
and Polisis come within reasonable proximity. In order
to delve more into the factors behind this finding, we
conducted a manual analysis of the policies. We found
that, due to the way privacy policies are typically written,
data collection and sharing are discussed in dedicated
parts of the policy, without mentioning user choices. The
choices (mostly opt-out) are discussed in a separate sec-
tion when present, and they cover a small subset of the
collected/shared data. In several cases, these choices
are neither about the unexpected use (i.e., advertising)
nor unexpected collection by third parties (i.e., advertis-
ing/analytics). Although our primary hypothesis is that
this is due to TRUSTe’s database being generally permis-
sive, it can be partially attributed to a potential discrep-
ancy between our versions of analyzed policies and the
versions used by TRUSTe (despite our efforts to reduce
this discrepancy).
6.3 Discussion
There was no loss of generality when considering only
two of the icons; they provided the needed evidence
of TRUSTe/TrustArc potentially following a permissive
strategy when assigning icons to policies. A developer
could still utilize Polisis to extract the rest of the icons
by either augmenting the existing taxonomy or by per-
forming additional natural language processing on the
segments returned by Polisis. In the vast majority of the
cases, whenever the icon definition is to be changed (e.g.,
to reflect a modification in the regulations), this change
can be supported at the rules level, without modifying
Polisis itself. This is because Polisis already predicts a
comprehensive set of labels, covering a wide variety of
rules.
Furthermore, by automatically generating icons, we
do not intend to push humans completely out of the loop,
especially in situations where legal liability issues might
arise. Polisis can assist human annotators by providing
initial answers to their queries and the supporting evi-
dence. In other words, it accurately flags the segments of
interest to an annotator’s query so that the annotator can
make a final decision.
7 Free-form Question-Answering
Our second application of Polisis is PriBot, a sys-
tem that enables free-form queries (in the form of user
questions) on privacy policies. PriBot is primarily moti-
vated by the rise of conversation-first devices, such as
voice-activated digital assistants (e.g., Amazon Alexa
and Google Assistant) and smartwatches. For these de-
vices, the existing techniques of linking to a privacy pol-
icy or reading it aloud are not usable. They might require
the user to access privacy-related information and con-
trols on a different device, which is not desirable in the
long run [8].
To support these new forms of services and the emerg-
ing need for automated customer support in this do-
main [43], we present PriBot as an intuitive and user-
friendly method to communicate privacy information.
PriBot answers free-form user questions from a previ-
ously unseen privacy policy, in real time and with high
accuracy. Next, we formalize the problem of free-form
privacy QA and then describe how we leverage Polisis to
build PriBot.
7.1 Problem Formulation
The input to PriBot consists of a user question q about
a privacy policy. PriBot passes q to the ML layer and the
policy’s link to the Data Layer. The ML layer probabilis-
tically annotates q and each policy’s segments with the
privacy categories and attribute-value pairs of Fig. 3.
The segments in the privacy policy constitute the pool
of candidate answers {a1,a2, . . . ,aM}. A subset G of the
answer pool is the ground-truth. We consider an answer
ak as correct if ak ∈ G and as incorrect if ak /∈ G . If G is
empty, then no answers exist in the privacy policy.
7.2 PriBot Ranking Algorithm
Ranking Score: In order to answer the user question,
PriBot ranks each potential answer6 a by computing a
proximity score s(q,a) between a and the question q.
This is within the Class Comparison module of the Ap-
plication Layer. To compute s(q,a), we proceed as fol-
lows. Given the output of the Segment Classifier, an an-
swer is represented as a vector:
α = {p(ci|a)2× p(v j|a) | ∀ci ∈ C ,v j ∈ V (ci)}
6For notational simplicity, we henceforth use a to indicate an an-
swer instead of ak .
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for categories ci ∈ C and values v j ∈ V (ci) descending
from ci. Similarly, given the output of the Query Ana-
lyzer, the question is represented as:
β = {p(ci|q)2× p(v j|q) | ∀ci ∈ C ,v j ∈ V (ci)}
The category probability in both α and β is squared to
put more weight on the categories at the time of com-
parison. Next, we compute a certainty measure of the
answer’s high-level categorization. This measure is de-
rived from the entropy of the normalized probability dis-
tribution (pn) of the predicted categories:
cer(a) = 1− (−∑(pn(ci|a)× ln(pn(ci|a)))/ ln(|C |))
(1)
Akin to a dot product between two vectors, we com-
pute the score s(q,a) as:
s(q,a) =
∑i(βi×min(βi,αi))
∑iβ 2i
× cer(a) (2)
As answers are typically longer than the question and
involve a higher number of significant features, this score
prioritizes the answers containing significant features
that are also significant in the question. The min func-
tion and the denominator are used to normalize the score
within the range [0,1].
To illustrate the strength of PriBot and its answer-
ranking approach, we consider the following question
(posed by a Twitter user):
“Under what circumstances will you release to 3rd parties?”
Then, we consider two examples of ranked segments
by PriBot. The first segment has a ranking score of 0.63:
“Personal information will not be used or disclosed for pur-
poses other than those for which it was collected, except
with the consent of the individual or as required by law. . . ”
The second has a ranking score of 0: “All personal in-
formation collected by the TTC will be protected by using
appropriate safeguards against loss, theft and unauthorized
access, disclosure, copying, use or modification.”
Although both example segments share terms such as
“personal” and “information,” PriBot ranks them differ-
ently. It accounts for the fact that the question and the
first segment share the same high-level category: 3rd
Party Collection while the second segment is categorized
under Data Security.
Confidence Indicator: The ranking score is an internal
metric that specifies how close each segment is to the
question, but does not relay PriBot’s certainty in report-
ing a correct answer to a user. Intuitively, the confidence
in an answer should be low when (1) the answer is se-
mantically far from the question (i.e., s(q,a) is low), (2)
the question is interpreted ambiguously by Polisis, (i.e.,
classified into multiple high-level categories resulting in
a high classification entropy), or (3) when the question
contains unknown words (e.g., in a non-English language
or with too many spelling mistakes). Taking into consid-
eration these criteria, we compute a confidence indicator
as follows:
conf(q,a) = s(q,a)∗ (cer(q)+ frac(q))
2
(3)
where the categorization certainty measure cer(q) is
computed similarly to cer(a) in Eq. (1), and s(q,a) is
computed according to Eq. (2). The fraction of known
words frac(q) is based on the presence of the question’s
words in the vocabulary of our Policies Embeddings’ cor-
pus.
Potentially Conflicting Answers Another challenge is
displaying potentially conflicting answers to users. One
answer could describe a general sharing clause while an-
other specifies an exception (e.g., one answer specifies
“share” and another specifies “do not share”). To miti-
gate this issue, we used the same CNN classifier of Sec. 4
and exploited the fact that the OPP-115 dataset had op-
tional labels of the form: “does” vs. “does not” to indi-
cate the presence or absence of sharing/collection. Our
classifier had a cross-validation F1 score of 95%. Hence,
we can use this classifier to detect potential discrepancies
between the top-ranked answers. The UI of PriBot can
thus highlight the potentially conflicting answers to the
user.
8 PriBot Evaluation
We assess the performance of PriBot with two met-
rics: the predictive accuracy (Sec. 8.3) of its QA-ranking
model and the user-perceived utility (Sec. 8.4) of the pro-
vided answers. This is motivated by research on the eval-
uation of recommender systems, where the model with
the best accuracy is not always rated to be the most help-
ful by users [44].
8.1 Twitter Dataset
In order to evaluate PriBot with realistic privacy ques-
tions, we created a new privacy QA dataset. It is worth
noting that we utilize this dataset for the purpose of test-
ing PriBot, not for training it. Our requirements for this
dataset were that it (1) must include free-form questions
about the privacy policies of different companies and (2)
must have a ground-truth answer for each question from
the associated policy.
To this end, we collected, from Twitter, privacy-related
questions users had tweeted at companies. This approach
avoids subject bias, which is likely to arise when elicit-
ing privacy-related questions from individuals, who will
not pose them out of genuine need. In our collection
methodology, we aimed at a QA test set of size be-
tween 100 and 200 QA pairs, as is the convention in
similar human-annotated QA evaluation domains, such
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as the Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) and SemEval-
2015 [45, 46, 47].
To avoid searching for questions via biased keywords,
we started by searching for reply tweets that direct
the users to a company’s privacy policy (e.g., using
queries such as ”filter:replies our privacy policy” and
”filter:replies our privacy statement” ). We then back-
tracked these reply tweets to the (parent) question tweets
asked by customers to obtain a set of 4,743 pairs of
tweets, containing privacy questions but also substan-
tial noise due to the backtracking approach. Following
the best practices of noise reduction in computational
social science, we automatically filtered the tweets to
keep those containing question marks, at least four words
(excluding links, hashtags, mentions, numbers and stop
words), and a link to the privacy policy, leaving 260 pairs
of question–reply tweets. This is an example of a tweet
pair which was removed by the automatic filtering:
Question: “@Nixxit your site is very suspicious.”
Answer: “@elitelinux Updated it with our privacy policy.
Apologies, but we’re not fully up yet and running shoe
string.”
Next, two of the authors independently validated each
of the tweets to remove question tweets (a) that were
not related to privacy policies, (b) to which the replies
are not from the official company account, and (c) with
inaccessible privacy policy links in their replies. The
level of agreement (Cohen’s Kappa) among both anno-
tators for the labels valid vs. invalid was almost perfect
(κ = 0.84) [40]. The two annotators agreed on 231 of the
question tweets (of the 260), tagging 182 as valid and 49
as invalid. This is an example of a tweet pair which was
annotated as invalid:
Question: “What is your worth then? You can’t do it?
Nuts.”
Answer: “@skychief26 3/3 You can view our privacy policy
at http://t.co/ksmaIK1WaY. Thanks.”
This is an example of a tweet pair annotated as valid:
Question: “@myen Are Evernote notes encrypted at rest?”
Answer: “We’re not encrypting at rest, but are en-
crypting in transit. Check out our Privacy Policy here:
http://bit.ly/1tauyfh.”
As we wanted to evaluate the answers to these ques-
tions with a user study, our estimates of an adequately-
sized study led us to randomly sample 120 tweets out of
the tweets which both annotators labeled as valid ques-
tions. We henceforth refer to them as the Twitter QA
Dataset. It is worth mentioning that although our QA ap-
plications extend beyond the Twitter medium, this kind
of questions is as close as we can get to testing with the
worst-case scenario: informal discourse, with spelling
and grammar errors, that is targeted at humans.
8.2 QA Baselines
We compare PriBot’s QA model against three baseline
approaches that we developed: (1) Retrieval reflects the
state-of-the-art in term-matching retrieval algorithms, (2)
SemVec representing a single neural network classifier,
and (3) Random as a control approach where questions
are answered with random policy segments.
Our first baseline, Retrieval, builds on the BM25 algo-
rithm [48], which is the state-of-the-art in ranking mod-
els employing term-matching. It has been used success-
fully across a range of search tasks, such as the TREC
evaluations [49]. We improve on the basic BM25 model
by computing the inverse document frequency on the
Policies Corpus of Sec. 4.2 instead of a single policy.
Retrieval ranks the segments in the policy according to
their similarity score with the user’s question. This score
depends on the presence of distinctive words that link a
user’s question to an answer.
Our second baseline, SemVec employs a single clas-
sifier trained to distinguish among all the (mandatory)
attribute-values (with > 20 annotations) from the OPP-
115 dataset (81 classes in total). An example segment is
“geographic location information or other location-based
information about you and your device”. We obtain a
micro-average precision of 0.56 (i.e., the classifier is, on
average, predicting the right label across the 81 classes
in 56% of the cases – compared to 3.6% precision for
a random classifier). After training this model, we ex-
tract a “semantic vector”: a representation vector that
accounts for the distribution of attribute values in the in-
put text. We extract this vector as the input to the sec-
ond dense layer (shown Fig. 4). SemVec ranks the sim-
ilarity between a question and a policy segment using
the Euclidean distance between semantic vectors. This
approach is similar to what has been applied previously
in image retrieval, where image representations learned
from a large-scale image classification task were effec-
tive in visual search applications [50].
8.3 Predictive Accuracy Evaluation
Here, we evaluate the predictive accuracy of PriBot’s
QA model by comparing its predicted answers against
expert-generated ground-truth answers for the questions
of the Twitter QA Dataset.
Ground-Truth Generation: Two of the authors gener-
ated the ground-truth answers to the questions from the
Twitter QA Dataset. They were given a user’s question
(tweet) and the segments of the corresponding policy.
Each policy consists of 45 segments on average (min=12,
max=344, std=37). Each annotator selected indepen-
dently, the subset of these segments which they consider
as best responding to the user’s question. This annota-
tion took place prior to generating the answers using our
models to avoid any bias. While deciding on the answers,
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Fig. 8: Accuracy metrics as a function of k.
the annotators accounted for the fact that multiple seg-
ments of the policy might answer a question.
After finishing the individual annotations, the two an-
notators consolidated the differences in their labels to
reach an agreed-on set of segments; each assumed to be
answering the question. We call this the ground-truth
set for each question. The annotators agreed on at least
one answer in 88% of the questions for which they found
matching segments, thus signifying a substantial over-
lap. Cohen’s κ , measuring the agreement on one or more
answer, was 0.65, indicating substantial agreement [40].
We release this dataset, comprising the questions, the
policy segments, and the ground-truth answers per ques-
tion at https://pribot.org/data.html.
We then generated, for each question, the predicted
ranked list of answers according to each QA model (Pri-
Bot and the other three baselines). In what follows, we
evaluate the predictive accuracy of these models.
Top-k Score: We first report the top-k score, a widely
used and easily interpretable metric, which denotes the
portion of questions having at least one correct answer
in the top k returned answers. It is desirable to achieve a
high top-k score for low values of k so that the user has
to process less information before reaching a correct an-
swer. Fig. 8a shows how the top-k score varies as a func-
tion of k. PriBot’s model has the best performance over
the other three models by a large margin, especially at the
low values of k. For example, at k= 1, PriBot has a top-k
score of 0.68, which is significantly larger than the scores
of 0.39 (Retrieval), 0.27 (SemVec), and 0.08 (Random)
(p-value < 0.05 according to pairwise Fisher’s exact test,
corrected with Bonferroni method for multiple compar-
isons). PriBot further reaches a top-k score of 0.75,
0.82, and 0.87 for k ∈ {2,3,4}. To put these numbers in
the wider context of free-form QA systems, we note that
the top-1 accuracy reported by IBM Watson’s team on a
large insurance domain dataset (a training set of 12,889
questions and 21,325 answers) was 0.65 in 2015 [51] and
was later improved to 0.69 in 2016 [52]. Given that Pri-
Bot had to overcome the absence of publicly available
QA datasets, our top-1 accuracy value of 0.68 is on par
with such systems. We also observe that the Retrieval
model outperforms the SemVec model. This result is not
entirely surprising since we seeded Retrieval with a large
corpus of 130K unsupervised policies, thus improving its
performance on answers with matching terms.
Policy Length We now assess the impact of the policy
length on PriBot’s accuracy. First, we report the Nor-
malized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) [53]. In-
tuitively, it indicates that a relevant document’s useful-
ness decreases logarithmically with the rank. This met-
ric captures how presenting the users with more choices
affects their user experience as they need to process
more text. Also, it is not biased by the length of the
policy. The DCG part of the metric is computed as
DCGk = ∑ki=1
reli
log2(i+1)
, where reli is 1 if answer ai is cor-
rect and 0 otherwise. NDCG at k is obtained by normal-
izing the DCGk with the maximum possible DCGk across
all values of k. We show in Fig. 8b the average NDCG
across questions for each value of k. It is clear that Pri-
Bot’s model consistently exhibits superior NDCG. This
indicates that PriBot is poised to perform better in a sys-
tem where low values of k matter the most.
Second, to further focus on the effect of policy length,
we categorize the policy lengths (#segments) into short,
medium, and high, based on the 33rd and the 66th per-
centiles (i.e., corresponding to #segments of 28 and 46).
We then compute a metric independent of k, namely, the
Mean Average Precision (MAP), which is the mean of
the area under the precision-recall curve across all ques-
tions. Informally, MAP is an indicator of whether all the
correct answers get ranked highly. We see from Fig. 9
that, for short policies, the Retrieval model is within 15%
of the MAP of PriBot’s model, which makes sense given
the smaller number of potential answers. With medium-
sized policies, PriBot’s model is better by a large margin.
This margin is still considerable with long policies.
Confidence Indicator Comparing the confidence (using
the indicator from Eq. (3)) of incorrect answers predicted
by PriBot (mean=0.37, variance=0.04) with the confi-
dence of correct answers (mean=0.49, variance =0.05)
shows that PriBot places lower confidence in the answers
that turn out to be incorrect. Hence, we can use the con-
fidence indicator to filter out the incorrect answers. For
example, by setting the condition: conf(q,a)≥ 0.6 to ac-
cept PriBot’s answers, we can enhance the top-1 accu-
racy to 70%. This indicator delivers another advantage:
its components are independently interpretable by the ap-
plication logic. If the score s(q,a) of the top-1 answer is
too low, the user can be notified that the policy might not
contain an answer to the question. A low value of cer(q)
indicates that the user might have asked an ambiguous
question; the system can ask the user back for a clarifica-
tion.
Pre-trained Embeddings Choice As discussed in
Sec. 4, we utilize our custom Policies Embeddings,
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which have the two properties of (1) being domain-
specific and (2) using subword embeddings to handle
out-of-vocabulary words. We test the efficacy of this
choice by studying three variants of pre-trained embed-
dings. For the first variant, we start from our Policies
Embeddings (PE), and we disable the subwords mode,
thus only satisfying the first property; we call it PE-
NoSub. The second variant is the fastText Wikipedia Em-
beddings from [54], trained on the English Wikipedia,
thus only satisfying the second property; we denote it as
WP. The third variant is WP, with the subword mode
disabled, thus satisfying neither property; we call it WP-
NoSub. In Fig. 10, we show the top-k score of PriBot
on our Twitter QA dataset with each of the four pre-
trained embeddings. First, we can see that our Policies
Embeddings outperform the other models for all values
of k, scoring 14% and 5% more than the closest vari-
ant at k = 1 and k = 2, respectively. As expected, the
domain-specific model without subwords embeddings
(PE-NoSub) has a weaker performance by a significant
margin, especially for the top-1 answer. Interestingly, the
difference is much narrower between the two Wikipedia
embeddings since their vocabulary already covers more
than 2.5M tokens. Hence, subword embeddings play a
less pronounced role there. In sum, the advantage of us-
ing subwords embeddings with the PE model originates
from their domain specificity and their ability to compen-
sate for the missing words from the vocabulary.
8.4 User-Perceived Utility Evaluation
We conducted a user study to assess the user-perceived
utility of the automatically generated answers. This as-
sessment was done for each of the four different con-
ditions (Retrieval, SemVec, PriBot and Random). We
evaluated the top-3 responses of each QA approach to
each question. Thus, we assess the utility of 360 answers
to 120 questions per approach.
Study Design: We used a between-subject design by
constructing four surveys, each corresponding to a differ-
ent evaluation condition. We display a series of 17 QA
pairs (each on a different page). Of these, 15 are a ran-
dom subset of the pool of 360 QA pairs (of the evaluated
condition) such that a participant does not receive two
Fig. 11: An example of a QA pair displayed to the respon-
dents.
QA pairs with the same question. The other two ques-
tions are randomly positioned anchor questions serving
as attention checkers. Additionally, we enforce a mini-
mum duration of 15 seconds for the respondent to eval-
uate each QA pair, with no maximum duration enforced.
We include an open-ended Cloze reading comprehension
test [55]; we used the test to weed out the responses with
a low score, indicating a poor reading skill.
Participant Recruitment: After obtaining an IRB ap-
proval, we recruited 700 Amazon MTurk workers with
previous success rate >95%, to complete our survey.
With this number of users, each QA pair received eval-
uations from at least 7 different individuals. We com-
pensated each respondent with $2. With an average
completion time of 14 minutes, this makes the average
pay around $8.6 per hour (US Federal minimum wage
is $7.25). While not fully representative of the general
population, our set of participants exhibited high intra-
group diversity, but little difference across the respon-
dent groups. Across all respondents, the average age is
34 years (std=10.5), 62% are males, 38% are females,
more than 82% are from North America, more than 87%
have some level of college education, and more than 88%
reported being employed.
QA Pair Evaluation: To evaluate the relevance for a
QA pair, we display the question and the candidate an-
swer as shown in Fig. 11. We asked the respondents to
rate whether the candidate response provides an answer
to the question on a 5-point Likert scale (1=Definitely Yes
to 5=Definitely No), as evident in Fig. 11. We denote a
respondent’s evaluation of a single candidate answer cor-
responding to a QA pair as relevant (irrelevant) if s/he
chooses either Definitely Yes (Definitely No) or Partially
Yes (Partially No). We consolidate the evaluations of
multiple users per answer by following the methodology
outlined in similar studies [10], which consider the an-
swer as relevant if labeled as relevant by a certain frac-
tion of users. We took this fraction as 50% to ensure a
majority agreement. Generally, we observed the respon-
dents to agree on the relevance of the answers. Highly
mixed responses, where 45–55% of the workers tagged
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Table 4: top-k relevance score by evaluation group.
Group N
top-k Relevance Score
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
Random 180 0.37 0.59 0.76
Retrieval 184 0.46 0.71 0.79
SemVec 153 0.48 0.71 0.85
PriBot 183 0.70 0.78 0.89
the answer as relevant, constituted less than 16% of the
cases.
User Study Results: As in the previous section, we com-
pute the top-k score for relevance (i.e., the portion of
questions having at least one user-relevant answer in the
top k returned answers). Table 4 shows this score for
the four QA approaches with k ∈ {1,2,3}, where PriBot
clearly outperforms the three baseline approaches. The
respondents regarded at least one of the top-3 answers as
relevant for 89% of the questions, with the first answer
being relevant in 70% of the cases. In comparison, for
k = 1, the scores were 46% and 48% for the Retrieval
and the SemVec models respectively (p-value <= 0.05
according to pairwise Fishers exact test, corrected with
Holm-Bonferroni method for multiple comparisons). An
avid reader might notice some differences between the
predictive models’ accuracy (Section 8.3) and the users’
perceived quality. This is actually consistent with the ob-
servations from research in recommender systems where
the prediction accuracy does not always match user’s sat-
isfaction [44]. For example, the top-k score metric for
accuracy differs by 2%, -3%, and 6% with respect to the
perceived relevance in the PriBot model. Another ex-
ample is that the SemVec model and the Retrieval have
smaller differences in this study than Sec. 8.3. We con-
jecture that the score shift with SemVec model is due
to some users accepting answers which match the ques-
tion’s topic even when the actual details of the answer
are irrelevant.
9 Discussion
Limitations Polisis might be limited by the employed
privacy taxonomy. Although the OPP-115 taxonomy
covers a wide variety of privacy practices [11], there are
certain types of applications that it does not fully cap-
ture. One mitigation is to use Polisis as an initial step
in order to filter the relevant data at a high level before
applying additional, application-specific text processing.
Another mitigation is to leverage Polisis’ modularity by
amending it with new categories/attributes and training
these new classes on the relevant annotated dataset.
Moreover, Polisis, like any automated approach, ex-
hibits instances of misclassification that should be ac-
counted for in any application building on it. One way to
mitigate this problem is using confidence scores, similar
to that of Eq. (3) to convey the (un)certainty of a reported
result, whether it is an answer, an icon, or another form of
short notice. Last but not least, Polisis is not guaranteed
to be robust in handling an adversarially constructed pri-
vacy policy. An adversary could include valid and mean-
ingful statements in the privacy policy, carefully crafted
to mislead Polisis’ automated classifiers. For example,
an adversary can replace words, in the policy, with syn-
onyms that are far in our embeddings space. While the
modified policy has the same meaning, Polisismight mis-
classify the modified segments.
Deployment: We provide three prototype web applica-
tions for end-users. The first is an application that visual-
izes the different aspects in the privacy policy, powered
by the annotations from Polisis (available as a web ap-
plication and a browser extension for Chrome and Fire-
fox). The second is a chatbot implementation of Pri-
Bot for answering questions about privacy policies in
a conversational interface. The third is an application
for extracting the privacy labels from several policies,
given their links. These applications are available at
https://pribot.org.
Legal Aspects We also want to stress the fact that Polisis
is not intended to replace the legally-binding privacy pol-
icy. Rather, it offers a complementary interface for pri-
vacy stakeholders to easily inquire the contents of a pri-
vacy policy. Following the trend of automation in legal
advice [56], insurance claim resolution [57], and privacy
policy presentation [58, 16], third parties, such as auto-
mated legal services firms or regulators, can deploy Poli-
sis as a solution for their users. As is the standard in such
situations, these parties should amend Polisis with a dis-
claimer specifying that it is based on automatic analysis
and does not represent the actual service provider [59].
Companies and service providers can internally de-
ploy an application similar to PriBot as an assistance
tool for their customer support agents to handle privacy-
related inquiries. Putting the human in the loop allows
for a favorable trade-off between the utility of Polisis
and its legal implications. For a wider discussion on
the issues surrounding automated legal analysis, we re-
fer the interested reader to the works of McGinnis and
Pearce [60] and Pasquale [61].
Privacy-Specificity of the Approach: Finally, our ap-
proach is uniquely tailored to the privacy domain both
from the data perspective and from the model-hierarchy
perspective. However, we envision that applications with
similar needs would benefit from extensions of our ap-
proach, both on the classification level and the QA level.
10 Related Work
Privacy Policy Analysis: There have been numerous at-
tempts to create easy-to-navigate and alternative presen-
tations of privacy policies. Kelley et al. [32] studied us-
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ing nutrition labels as a paradigm for displaying privacy
notices. Icons representing the privacy policies have also
been proposed [31, 62]. Others have proposed standards
to push service providers to encode privacy policies in
a machine-readable format, such as P3P [13], but they
have not been adopted by browser developers and ser-
vice providers. Polisis has the potential to automate the
generation of a lot of these notices, without relying on
the respective parties to do it themselves.
Recently, several researchers have explored the poten-
tial of automated analysis of privacy policies. For ex-
ample, Liu et al. [58] have used deep learning to model
the vagueness of words in privacy policies. Zimmeck
et al. [63] have been able to show significant incon-
sistencies between app practices and their privacy poli-
cies via automated analysis. These studies, among oth-
ers [64, 65], have been largely enabled by the release of
the OPP-115 dataset by Wilson et al. [11], containing
115 privacy policies extensively annotated by law stu-
dents. Our work is the first to provide a generic sys-
tem for the automated analysis of privacy policies. In
terms of the comprehensiveness and the accuracy of the
approach, Polisis makes a major improvement over the
state of the art. It allows transitioning from labeling of
policies with a few practices (e.g., the works by Zim-
meck and Bellovin [16] and Sathyendra et al. [17]) to a
much more fine-grained annotation (up to 10 high-level
and 122 fine-grained classes), thus enabling a richer set
of applications.
Evaluating the Compliance Industry: Regulators and
researchers are continuously scrutinizing the practices of
the privacy compliance industry [21, 38, 39]. Miyazaki
and Krishnamurthy [21] found no support that partici-
pating in a seal program is an indicator of following pri-
vacy practice standards. The FTC has found discrepan-
cies between the practical behaviors of the companies, as
reported in their privacy policies, and the privacy seals
they have been granted [39]. Polisis can be used by these
researchers and regulators to automatically, and contin-
uously perform such checks at scale. It can provide the
initial evidence that could be processed by skilled experts
afterward, thus reducing the analysis time and the cost.
Automated Question Answering: Our QA system, Pri-
Bot, is focused on non-factoid questions, which are usu-
ally complex and open-ended. Over the past few years,
deep learning has yielded superior results to traditional
retrieval techniques in this domain [51, 52, 66]. Our
main contribution is that we build a QA system, with-
out a dataset that includes questions and answers, while
achieving results on par with the state of the art on other
domains. We envision that our approach could be trans-
planted to other problems that face similar issues.
11 Conclusion
We proposed Polisis, the first generic framework that
enables detailed automatic analysis of privacy policies.
It can assist users, researchers, and regulators in process-
ing and understanding the content of privacy policies at
scale. To build Polisis, we developed a new hierarchy
of neural networks that extracts both high-level privacy
practices as well as fine-grained information from pri-
vacy policies. Using this extracted information, Polisis
enables several applications. In this paper, we demon-
strated two applications: structured and free-form query-
ing. In the first example, we use Polisis’ output to ex-
tract short notices from the privacy policy in the form
of privacy icons and to audit TRUSTe’s policy analysis
approach. In the second example, we build PriBot that
answers users’ free-form questions in real time and with
high accuracy. Our evaluation of both applications re-
veals that Polisis matches the accuracy of expert analysis
of privacy policies. Besides these applications, Polisis
opens opportunities for further innovative privacy policy
presentation mechanisms, including summarizing poli-
cies into simpler language. It can also enable compar-
ative shopping applications that advise the consumer by
comparing the privacy aspects of multiple applications
they want to choose from.
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Appendix A: Full Classification Results
We present the classification results at the category
level for the Segment Classifier and at 15 selected at-
tribute levels, using the hyperparameters of Table 1.
Classification results at the category level for the Segment Classifier
Label Prec. Recall F1 Top-1Prec.
Sup-
port
Data Retention 0.83 0.66 0.71 0.68 88
Data Security 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.79 201
Do Not Track 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.88 16
1st Party Collection 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 1211
Specific Audiences 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.93 156
Introductory/Generic 0.81 0.66 0.70 0.75 369
Policy Change 0.95 0.84 0.88 0.93 112
Non-covered Practice 0.76 0.67 0.70 0.60 280
Privacy Contact Info 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.88 137
3rd Party Sharing 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.82 908
Access, Edit, Delete 0.89 0.75 0.80 0.87 133
User Choice/Control 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.69 433
Average 0.85 0.79 0.81 0.80
Classification results for attribute: change-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
privacy-relevant-change 0.78 0.76 0.77 77
unspecified 0.79 0.76 0.76 90
Average 0.78 0.76 0.76
Classification results for attribute: notification-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
general-notice-in-privacy-policy 0.80 0.77 0.78 76
general-notice-on-website 0.64 0.62 0.62 52
personal-notice 0.69 0.66 0.67 50
unspecified 0.81 0.72 0.75 24
Average 0.73 0.69 0.71
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Classification results for attribute: do-not-track-policy
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
honored 1.00 1.00 1.00 8
not-honored 1.00 1.00 1.00 26
Average 1.00 1.00 1.00
Classification results for attribute: security-measure
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
data-access-limitation 0.89 0.78 0.81 35
generic 0.84 0.83 0.83 102
privacy-review-audit 0.97 0.58 0.62 13
privacy-security-program 0.87 0.69 0.73 31
secure-data-storage 0.82 0.64 0.69 17
secure-data-transfer 0.91 0.80 0.84 26
secure-user-authentication 0.97 0.58 0.63 12
Average 0.90 0.70 0.74
Classification results for attribute: personal-information-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
computer-information 0.84 0.80 0.82 88
contact 0.90 0.89 0.90 342
cookies-and-tracking-elements 0.95 0.92 0.94 272
demographic 0.93 0.90 0.92 86
financial 0.89 0.86 0.87 99
generic-personal-information 0.82 0.79 0.80 441
health 1.00 0.56 0.61 8
ip-address-and-device-ids 0.93 0.93 0.93 104
location 0.88 0.88 0.88 107
personal-identifier 0.67 0.61 0.63 31
social-media-data 0.73 0.84 0.78 23
survey-data 0.77 0.86 0.81 22
unspecified 0.71 0.70 0.71 456
user-online-activities 0.80 0.82 0.81 224
user-profile 0.79 0.68 0.72 96
Average 0.84 0.80 0.81
Classification results for attribute: purpose
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
additional-service-feature 0.75 0.76 0.75 374
advertising 0.92 0.91 0.92 286
analytics-research 0.88 0.86 0.87 239
basic-service-feature 0.76 0.73 0.74 401
legal-requirement 0.92 0.91 0.91 79
marketing 0.86 0.83 0.84 312
merger-acquisition 0.95 0.96 0.95 38
personalization-customization 0.79 0.80 0.80 149
service-operation-and-security 0.81 0.77 0.79 200
unspecified 0.72 0.68 0.70 249
Average 0.84 0.82 0.83
Classification results for attribute: choice-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
browser-device-privacy-controls 0.89 0.95 0.92 171
dont-use-service-feature 0.69 0.65 0.67 213
first-party-privacy-controls 0.75 0.62 0.66 71
opt-in 0.78 0.81 0.79 406
opt-out-link 0.82 0.74 0.77 167
opt-out-via-contacting-company 0.87 0.81 0.84 127
third-party-privacy-controls 0.82 0.62 0.66 99
unspecified 0.65 0.54 0.56 117
Average 0.78 0.72 0.73
Classification results for attribute: third-party-entity
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
collect-on-first-party-website-
app 0.78 0.64 0.68 113
receive-shared-with 0.87 0.87 0.87 843
see 0.83 0.79 0.81 63
track-on-first-party-website-app 0.75 0.86 0.79 107
unspecified 0.60 0.51 0.52 57
Average 0.77 0.74 0.73
Classification results for attribute: access-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
edit-information 0.65 0.62 0.63 172
unspecified 0.98 0.64 0.71 14
view 0.55 0.53 0.53 47
Average 0.73 0.60 0.62
Classification results for attribute: audience-type
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
californians 0.98 0.97 0.98 60
children 0.98 0.97 0.97 161
europeans 0.97 0.95 0.96 23
Average 0.98 0.97 0.97
Classification results for attribute: choice-scope
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
both 0.61 0.53 0.54 71
collection 0.74 0.68 0.70 302
first-party-collection 0.63 0.55 0.56 109
first-party-use 0.80 0.68 0.71 236
third-party-sharing-collection 0.81 0.60 0.64 98
third-party-use 0.57 0.51 0.50 60
unspecified 0.55 0.55 0.55 76
use 0.62 0.55 0.56 140
Average 0.67 0.58 0.59
Classification results for attribute: action-first-party
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
collect-in-mobile-app 0.84 0.75 0.79 68
collect-on-mobile-website 0.58 0.54 0.56 11
collect-on-website 0.65 0.65 0.65 739
unspecified 0.61 0.60 0.60 294
Average 0.67 0.64 0.65
Classification results for attribute: does-does-not
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
does 0.82 0.93 0.86 1436
does-not 0.82 0.93 0.86 200
Average 0.82 0.93 0.86
Classification results for attribute: retention-period
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
indefinitely 0.45 0.48 0.47 8
limited 0.74 0.75 0.75 27
stated-period 0.94 0.94 0.94 10
unspecified 0.82 0.77 0.77 41
Average 0.74 0.74 0.73
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Classification results for attribute: identifiability
Label Prec. Recall F1 Support
aggregated-or-anonymized 0.89 0.89 0.89 284
identifiable 0.81 0.81 0.81 492
unspecified 0.63 0.63 0.63 98
Average 0.77 0.78 0.77
Appendix B: Applications’ Screenshots
In this appendix, we first show screenshots of PriBot’s
web app, answering questions about multiple companies
(Fig. 12 to Fig. 17). Next, we show screenshots from our
web application for navigating the results produced by
Polisis (Fig. 18 to Fig. 20). These apps are available at
https://pribot.org.
Fig. 12: The first answer from our chatbot implemen-
tation of PriBot about third-party sharing in the case
of Bose.com. Answers are annotated by a header men-
tioning the high level category (e.g., Context of sharing
with third parties). The confidence metric is also high-
lighted int the interface.
Fig. 13: The first answer about data retention in the
case of Medium. Notice the semantic matching in the
absence of common terms. Notice also that only one
answer is shown as it is the only one with high confi-
dence. Hence, the user is not distracted by irrelevant
answers.
Fig. 14: The answer given a question “do you bla bla
bla”, showcasing the power of the confidence metric,
accounting for unknown words in the question and re-
laying that particular reason to the user.
Fig. 15: This case illustrates the scenario when PriBot
finds no answer in the policy and explains the reason
based on the automatically detected high-level category
(explanations are preset in the application).
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Fig. 16: This case illustrates the power of subword
embeddings. Given a significantly misspelled question
“how much shoud i wait for you to delet my data”, Pri-
Bot still finds the most relevant answer.
Fig. 17: This case, with the policy of Oyoty.com, il-
lustrates automatic accounting for discrepancies across
segments (Sec. 7.1) by warning the user about that.
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Fig. 18: We show a case where our web app visualizes the result produced by Polisis. The app shows the flow of the
data being collected, the reasons behind that, and the choices given to the user in the privacy policy. The user can
check the policy statements for each link by hovering over it.
Fig. 19: In this case, the security aspects of the policy are highlighted based on the labels extracted from Polisis. The
user has the option to see the related statement by expanding each item in the app.
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Fig. 20: Here, the user is presented with the choices possible, automatically retrieved from Polisis.
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